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Law in other Contexts:  
Stand Bravely Brothers! A Report from the Law Wars 
 
By Oscar Guardiola-Rivera 
 
Abstract. This essay argues against the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not so well-
ordered’ societies, and the sociological model of the subject as pacified, fearful and isolated that 
informs current research on legal theory and globalization. It is argued that this model, which presents 
us with a pacified individual, narcissistic and isolated, portrayed by sociology as alone, conflict-
adverse and full of himself –in ‘harmony’- is just an illusion, a reflection of the actual rules of the 
game of competition, dispute and conflict. In contrast, this essay takes sides with the anthropological 
and philosophical tradition that conceives the subject as antagonistic and in state of lack, profoundly 
concerned with the other, whom she imitates and whose standpoint she must be able to share if she is 
to make sense of the world. Furthermore, it is argued that transitivity or imitation –mimesis- lies at the 
very origin of conflict and dispute; lack and antagonism remain thus at the core of society, in spite of 
the surface appearance of harmony that characterises post-modern societies. Because of this, any 
general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the time of globalisation must make the 
experience of antagonism and violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its 
subject of study. To do this, it must abandon the dualist conception of subjects and societies expressed 
in the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ (more violent) and ‘not-so-well-ordered’ (less violent) 
societies that has informed its investigation to this day, in order to declare in the most general terms a 
critique of violence from the standpoint of the victim, as of a piece with its demand for global social 
and political justice. On this aspect, the findings of anthropologists such as Laura Nader and José Gil 
–that the study of the reality of dispute and dispute resolution is badly served by the model of 
harmony/equality, and that the pacifying use of this model becomes an obstacle to any politics of 
common justice- are far closer to the truth than the intuitions of mainstream legal theory and political 
philosophy. In the mid and final sections, the essay focuses on Nader’s study of the effects of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) in the law and politics of common justice.   
 
1.  The Law Wars: A report on the present state of legal theoretical 
knowledge.    
  This essay arose from a sense of puzzlement at the paradoxical state of socio-
legal and legal theoretical knowledge at the time of globalization. On the one hand, it 
is widely held that processes of globalization have resulted in the hegemony of a 
certain type of dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions commonly associated 
with market liberalism and democracy. In mainstream legal theory and political 
philosophy, societies that feature a commitment to this sort of mechanisms are termed 
“well-ordered societies”. It is widely understood from this perspective that the point 
of legal and political theory or philosophy is the justification of the procedures, 
institutions and dispute-resolution mechanisms of such societies. This understanding 
is shared by a group of writers that might differ in other respects, from H. L. A. Hart 
and John Rawls to Ronald Dworkin and Brian Z. Tamanaha.  
On the other hand, there is widespread recognition that ‘the beginning of the 
new millennium has witnessed a groundswell of proposals for the transformation or 
replacement of the national and international institutions underpinning hegemonic, 
neo-liberal globalization’.1 Put forth by a considerable number of anti-systemic and 
anti-hegemonic movements and social organizations, articulated as trans-national and 
trans-modern networks, these proposals challenge the mainstream view that there is 
no operative alternative to the dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions of 
market and political liberalism.  
Their persistence and global spread since the beginning of the millennium 
obliges us to reconsider the point of legal theory as understood by the mainstream. 
Such is the point of this essay: the aim of this piece is to engage with the results of 
certain ethnographic projects concerning dispute resolution, the origins of modern 
legal-political institutions and the responses of anti-systemic and anti-hegemonic 
movements to the present order, with the purpose of widening the present focus of 
legal theory and socio-legal knowledge. At a more general level, this essay will 
discuss the explanatory power of the concept of “transition” or mimesis –developed 
first in ethnography, systems theory and cognitive science- as a tool to better our 
understanding of demands for social and political justice put forward by disputant 
bodies and anti-hegemonic movements. The centrality of their antagonism for a 
widened focus in legal theory means that this enterprise will take the shape of a 
critique of (state and inter-state) violence, already outlined in the writings of people 
like Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno. What the latter means and entails will 
be the subject of the concluding sections of this paper.   
The argument of this paper is that contextual and socio-legal theory today 
must take into account the demand for social justice at a global scale advanced by 
social and political actors that, more often than not, come from not so ‘well-ordered’ 
societies, and which is made concrete in transformed procedures and institutions, 
rather than the more particular and parochial interest in the justification of the 
procedures and institutions of so-called ‘well-ordered’ or liberal societies. 
This demand, and the challenge that it entails to the hegemony of liberal 
procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms, remains unnoticed by mainstream 
legal theory and political philosophy because of its justificatory focus on the 
procedures of ‘well-ordered societies’. As suggested before, the proposal here is that 
                                                 
1 De Sousa Santos, B. & Rodríguez-Garavito, C. ‘Law, Politics and the Subaltern in Counter-
hegemonic Globalization’, in their co-edited Law and Globalization From Below (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 1. 
this focus should be widened. Moreover, since there are reasons to believe that the 
very dichotomy between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not so well-ordered’ societies may turn 
out to be misleading, both in the analytical and the descriptive sense, it is proposed 
here that we use socio-legal knowledge concerning not so well-ordered or 
“traditional” societies, mainly ethnography and the theories of self-organization, in 
order to better our understanding about the origins and fate of dispute resolution 
mechanisms and institutions in late modern societies.  
Such a sense of unease with the dichotomy between well-ordered and not so 
well-ordered societies stems from the fact that it leaves out any possible comparison 
condition that would provide sense to the justificatory enterprise. Put in simple terms, 
mainstream legal theory and political philosophy seems to be engaged in dubious 
enterprise of justifying liberal institutions (e.g. democracy, rule of law, human rights) 
to liberal societies already convinced about their worth, a form of self-authorization 
that shows no regard for the analytical and empirical importance of the experience of 
alterity in global society. As a result of this situation mainstream legal theory and 
political philosophy appears unscientific, and is fast becoming irrelevant. This 
becomes a more serious issue if and when we take into account the widely recognized 
fact that, as a result of globalization, the experience of alterity and comparison (which 
entails also the psychological and inter-individual experiences of envy and mimetic 
violence) takes place within societies frequently organised under the ‘one legal 
system fits all’ model. This is to say that the conflict-ridden co-existence of well-
ordered and traditional societies takes place within supposedly homogeneous cultural, 
legal and political systems; moreover, this is an intra-national as much as a trans-
national experience. Therefore, it is a mistake to assume that the distinction works as 
a model of planetary conflicts of globalization setting ‘modern’ societies against 
‘traditional’ ones (as in the idea of a clash of civilizations, or the modern west v. the 
rest) or else, as a recourse to multitude (the idea that there are multiple, ordered and 
disordered, modernities). In both cases, multiplication functions as a form of 
disavowal of the antagonism that inheres in the notion of modernity as such, as 
embedded in the liberal market and political system.  
It is also a mistake to assume that the ‘one legal system fits all’ model –the 
‘western’ or ‘modern’ model of the rule of law- can act as the cause of social harmony 
against the divisiveness of tradition. Here again, the assumption operates as the 
disavowal of the real antagonism at the heart of modernity: not modernity v. tradition, 
but the antagonism that emerges from the relationship between modernity and the 
experience of divided life under market capitalism. In any case, power and law are not 
the cause of social order but merely an expression of it: laws are the expression of the 
relationships between men; they do not constitute social relations but declare that 
such relationships exist. Thus, they are the declaration of an event or a fact, as 
Benjamin Constant once observed. Actually, it would be more correct to say that the 
model of equality under law expresses an enhanced experience of division and 
differentiation.  
Under conditions of equality each citizen perceives the other as fundamentally 
similar in every respect, neither as a superior nor as an inferior, and by the same 
principle his/her association with the other does not follow the rules of custom or 
necessity. As a consequence, democratic societies are defined by the reflexive and 
pacifying affect that disposes each citizen towards the isolation of the mass of his 
equals and, because of this, ‘to withdraw at home with his friends and family’.2 This 
is the social affect that anthropologists such as Laura Nader have termed ‘harmony’, 
or more precisely ‘harmony ideology’, in a critical reference to the effects of this real 
structure upon public life and the management of common affairs.  
However, this apparent indifference towards the other masks a true obsession 
with the fate of our neighbours. Each citizen perceives the other as his/her equal and 
simultaneously tracks him or her as a rival. This is the logic of competition and envy 
that modern philosophers have described always in terms of a dichotomy without 
resolving it: amour de soi/amour propre in J. J. Rousseau, or master/slave in the case 
of G. W. F. Hegel. Mainstream legal theory and political philosophy merely repeats 
this description in the dichotomy between well-ordered and not so well-ordered 
societies. 
 In fact, the problem analysed by these dichotomies is that of a duality that is 
internal to the modern conception of the subject, which coincides with the duality in 
the legal conception of equality: on the one hand, subjects are posited as independent 
and incommensurable. By definition, this understanding of equality (as ‘tolerance’) 
corresponds perfectly to the vision of the narcissistic subject isolated from the mass of 
his others so dear to certain forms of contemporary sociology.  However, to 
emphasize this single term of the duality would result in a rather poor understanding 
                                                 
2 De Tocqueville, A. De la Démocratie en Amérique, vol. II, 2, II. 
of the differentiating process of modern societies, reducing the individual subject to 
an isolated expression of itself, liberated from any competition with others and any 
collective criteria of judgment. Thus, on the other hand, subjects are posited as 
competing against one another under criteria of meritocracy and conditions of 
equality of opportunities (equality as ‘competititon’, mainly in accordance to the rules 
of the market, but also in sports, politics and so on), that which presupposes some 
common criteria to judge and compare the results. This is the second aspect of our 
mainstream conceptions of equality, inseparable from the first, for under this aspect 
comparison with the other becomes the very measure and support of the egalitarian 
aspiration. 
 The tradition that is put to work in this essay has a very different conception 
of the subject, monist rather than dualist: the antagonistic subject, in state of lack, 
moved by desire for the other. This subject has been called with a variety of names in 
this tradition. It has been called ‘the poor’ (Adam Smith) or ‘the subaltern’ (Boa De 
Sousa Santos, Sylvia Rivera Cusicanqui); ‘the victim’, the ‘slum-collective’ (Enrique 
Dussel, Slavoj Zizek) or ‘the scapegoat’ (René Girard); ‘the oppressed’ as the subject 
of divine violence (Walter Benjamin) opposed to ‘the sovereign’ exceptional decider 
(in the work of German legal theorist Carl Schmitt). Anthropologists associated with 
this tradition speak with more or less fortune of ‘the powerful body’ (José Gil) or, in 
the more concrete context of US civil litigation and the NAFTA agreement, the 
‘disputant body’ or ‘the user’ (Laura Nader). Such a variety of names for the subject 
in this tradition will be used indifferently in the remainder of the essay.  
The point of this tradition is not just an inverse platitude to that of 
contemporary sociology, but rather, that the pacified individual, narcissistic and 
isolated, portrayed by sociology as alone, fearful, conflict-adverse and full of himself 
–that is, in ‘harmony’- is just an illusion, a reflection of the actual rules of the game of 
competition, dispute and conflict. If, on the contrary, the subject is posited, following 
this tradition, as antagonistic and in state of lack, the result is an active, rebellious, 
antagonistic and engaged subject. This is so because he/she is profoundly concerned 
with the other, whom she imitates and whose standpoint she must be able to share if 
she is to make sense of the world. David Hume and Adam Smith identified this 
faculty early on and called it “sympathy”; contemporary cognitive scientists such as 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela speak of “transition”, striking a chord that 
resonates with the anthropologists who study forms of mimesis among societies 
confronted by the challenges of modernity.  
Transitivity or imitation –mimesis- lies at the very origin of conflict and 
dispute; lack and antagonism remain at the core of society beneath the surface 
appearance of harmony, even more so in post-modern societies. Because of this, any 
general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the time of 
globalization must make the intra- and trans-national experience of antagonism and 
violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its object-matter of 
study.  
To do this, it must abandon the dualist conception of subjects and societies 
expressed in the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not-so-well-ordered’ 
societies that has informed its investigation to this day. Not in order to justify the 
sovereign’s monopoly of violence as the cause of social harmony, but rather, in order 
to declare in the most general terms a critique of violence from the standpoint of the 
victim, as of a piece with its demand for global social justice.  
On this aspect, the findings of anthropologists such as Laura Nader and José 
Gil –that the study of the reality of dispute and dispute resolution is badly served by 
the model of harmony/equality, and that the pacifying use of this model becomes an 
obstacle to any politics of common justice- are far closer to the truth than the 
intuitions of mainstream legal theory and political philosophy. In the following 
sections, let us shall focus on Nader’s study of the effects of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (ADR) in the law and politics of common justice. Her case 
study concerns the actual effects of the dispute mechanisms of the free-trade 
agreement known as NAFTA in the politics of North-American civil litigation. I 
emphasize the response to these effects by an anti-systemic movement, the EZLN of 
southern Mexico, and enquire if and how the movement’s demands can be relevant to 
socio-legal and legal theoretical knowledge. Given the global spread of such 
mechanisms and responses, travelling on the back of the World Bank’s jurisprudence 
and the theoretical-political practice of the variety of agents gathered together under 
the umbrella of the World Social Forum, her findings and questions can be 
generalized. However, as observed already, the focus of this paper will be on the 
status (within legal theory & political philosophy) of the political demands of 
common justice made by social subjects in the context of their refusal to enter the 
exceptional space of conflict management proposed under treaties such as NAFTA. 
In turn, this will lead us towards the mid-part of the essay to a more general 
focus on the question of transitivity and violence, and from there on to the possibility 
that socio-legal and theoretical knowledge may benefit from taking the form of a 
generalized critique of violence; such is the end point of this essay. Its starting point is 
that the legal model of equality enhances the experiences of alterity, envy and 
conflict. The study of conflict, dispute and dispute resolution must take this fact into 
account if it wishes to be relevant once again. 
 
2. Stand Bravely Brothers! Laura & the Anthropologists on the Pure Politics 
of the Law.               
Laura Nader’s The Life of the Law is the result of a series of ethnographic 
projects focusing on the current fashion of alternative and exceptional dispute 
resolution mechanisms (ADR) in the global legal and political arena. As she reminds 
us, this fashion was initiated by the introduction of such mechanisms in Chapters 4 
and 11 of the NAFTA treaty signed by Mexico, Canada and the United States in the 
context of trade and security integration in the Americas. Nowadays, such 
mechanisms have been exported to other jurisdictions such as the UK, where large 
City-based legal firms involved in trade-related dispute resolution have started to use 
them in the handling of their trans-Atlantic cases, and London-based law lecturers 
teach them as the last word in dispute resolution, the law of natural resources, and 
potentially –if included in treaties concerning integration for the purposes of security, 
or fused with the notion of a generalised duty to protect in international law- the 
treatment of armed conflict and terrorism.  
Such mechanisms include the use of off-shore venues and exceptional 
‘particularist’ measures required by the urgency of the times and the peculiar 
characteristics of certain situations, including the circumventing of regulatory powers 
of parliaments by emergency regulation and the creation of apparently law-free, but in 
fact law-saturated zones, or “states of exception” where the law of the sates involved 
does not apply or is replaced by ad hoc regulation. In the particular case of Chapters 4 
and 11 of the NAFTA treaty, for instance, dedicated to the protection of foreign 
investment and dispute resolution, the signatories are committed to concur at an ‘off-
shore’ arbitration tribunal in order to resolve ensuing disputes under principles of law 
which may effectively suspend the application of their sovereign legalities and even 
some accepted rules of international law. 
As it happens, the majority of the disputes resolved through these 
mechanisms, involving multinational investors and “sovereign” (well-ordered and not 
so well-ordered) states, concern the regulatory powers of the state. Due to a mixture 
of fairly established principles of international law and some radically new ideas on 
the definition of property, there is the possibility that when the exercise of such 
regulatory powers affects in any way the value of its investment, the multinational 
investor can claim that a ‘regulatory’ taking has occurred and ask for monetary 
compensation by the state.  
As a result of the treaty’s obligations, states find themselves facing investors 
in ‘equal’ conditions, that which may result, and has resulted, in enhanced 
antagonism, the state having to pay a foreign investor a considerable amount of 
taxpayers’ money for the exercise of its regulatory powers. The point is that NAFTA 
arbitrators, to return to Nader’s case study, unable to overturn domestic legislation, 
can award huge damages that may be nearly as crippling, ‘chilling governments from 
acting once they realize they will be “paying to regulate”’.3  
That is not all. Investor-to-state dispute resolution also provides a way for 
foreign litigants to seek government compensation for damages ordered by domestic 
courts in ‘civil wrongs’ cases; if successful, the result would do away with the 
potency of the civil plaintiff acting under the modern law of torts in these cases.4 
Furthermore, conflicts that are by definition public, insofar as they involve what will 
be later called the ‘unpayable debt’ that the state owes to individuals, end up being 
decided by private, closed-doors tribunals. The potential political consequences are 
not difficult to imagine.   
Take for instance the case of Mexican involvement in NAFTA: when 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced that his country had finally joined the 
‘First World’, an assertion explained by Mexico’s signature of NAFTA together with 
the US and Canada, the so called Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) 
occupied the south of the country and declared that the whole of the Mexican society 
was actually reflected in the mirror-image of its outcasts and victims, who refused to 
enter into the space inaugurated by the treaty. 
It would be a misunderstanding to consider this event from the point of view 
of mere failure of democratic procedure or representation. Rather than representation, 
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the logic that is operating here is one of exception, subtraction or substitution. The 
opening words of the EZLN First Declaration were ‘we are the product of 500 years 
of struggle’. They used a politically charged language in order to speak to the 
question of the rights of women, to ‘the just struggle of rural Mexico for land and 
freedom’, to the Laws of Rights and Obligations of Peoples in Struggle, and went 
beyond the language of law & human rights in their explicit refusal to become the 
sacrificial victims of the newly proposed global governance arrangement. In effect, 
they said, like Melville’s Bartleby, ‘I rather not’, and turned that act of situated refusal 
into a sign of the general condition of the societies involved in NAFTA. Whether 
Canadian, Mexican, or American, the ‘loosers’ in this new game called free-trade 
would have no part to play. The political intervention of the Zapatistas attempted to 
turn their ‘residual’ status into the basis of another order, which was not only possible 
but actually necessary if these people were to subsist or exist at all.  
As an analyst, one must question this use of legal and political discourse. 
Where do these ‘Laws & Rights’ come from? What do the Zapatistas mean when they 
speak of ‘just struggle’, ‘obligations’, ‘freedom’ and, crucially, ‘peoples in struggle’? 
Why do they speak in global terms, addressing the peoples of the world and the 
outcasts of the nations of the Earth, rather than just their fellow Mexicans? Can their 
opposition to the new international law of trade and security mean anything in terms 
of radical political subjectivity at a time when radical politics is itself in question? 
That sort of investigation would have to reject outright condemnation or justification, 
but also a form of re-description of the legal and political phenomena that would 
cease to make these subjects and queries problematic to us. Research does not seek to 
domesticate its problems, glorify them or dismiss them. It aims at achieving a superior 
understanding. To achieve such a superior perspective, the researcher would have to 
meet the Zapatistas in the space that they have posited themselves.5 
This is not the space of the political or the legal as understood by mainstream 
legal and political theory (conceived as either philosophy or social science). For 
                                                 
5 I have already mentioned Laura Nader’s work in anthropology as a source of inspiration. The present 
work is inspired by and located at the interface between law, theory and anthropology. For other 
examples of the kind of research that I have in mind see De Sousa Santos, B. & Rodriguez, C. Law and 
Globalization From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge University Press: 2005; 
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. ‘International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing 
Resistance’, in 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2003; also his International Law From 
Below, Cambridge University Press, 2003;  and importantly, Escobar, Arturo. ‘Other Worlds Are 
(Already) Possible: Self-organisation, Complexity and Post-capitalist Cultures’ in World Social Forum: 
Challenging Empires, The Viveka Foundation, 2004.  
instance, if the point of political philosophy is ‘to justify the monopoly of violence in 
the hands of the state’, as Ronald Dworkin claims, by assuming such a perspective the 
investigator has already precluded any understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation. Thus, in respect to its discipline, field or perspective, such phenomena 
would be unthinkable, undeserving of attention, in a word, exceptional. 
But the problem with exceptions is that they are resilient. No matter how 
strongly the analyst believes its object to be a non-object, it returns forcefully (usually 
in the form of a categorical refusal) to remind him or her of its existence, or rather, to 
put an end to its inexistence. That is not all.  The issue at stake in these sorts of 
phenomena is not recognition within the community, but rather, a break with any 
form of communitarianism, the shattering of the community (self and other) as it is 
(legally) organized in the present situation.  
The question is not ‘is this a normal usage of the term ‘law’?’, but rather, ‘just 
what falls under the term ‘law’? Postulated in this manner, the question becomes one 
of understanding what is lost in the enquiries about the normal usage of a term, that is, 
how a term is re-appropriated from below. If normal research results in the average 
being taken for general knowledge, then we must aim for a kind of research that 
accounts for those events in which the exceptional, in its particular exteriority, takes 
on the form of universal knowledge. The emergence of the EZLN is precisely that 
kind of event; it is one of the clearest examples of re-entry of lacking, antagonist 
bodies in the social, legal and political system(s) of modernity unleashing the beyond 
of modernity. However, this movement beyond particularity and generality, this 
eskhaton, must not be understood as an overcoming in the sense of utopian openness 
bringing forth the accomplishment of a forever-delayed promise. This would be to 
repeat the form of indefinite deferral and revolution that is the very mechanism at 
work in capital and empire. Rather, this movement is nothing more than a ‘small 
adjustment’: the unexpected and uninvited transition, the intrusion (which, 
paradoxically, has the form of a refusal to enter, á la Kafka, á la Bartleby) of the so-
called Third World or ‘Global South’ (labour, anti-globalisation, the many-headed 
Hydra) into the First World or the ‘Global North’.6 
                                                 
6 The point here is that the object cause of desire in the foundational fantasy of the West is the ‘Third 
World’, particularly the New World. Thus, John Locke writes in the Second treatise on Government: 
‘In the beginning all the world was America’.  
Before introducing Laura Nader’s critique of the dispute mechanisms referred 
to in the opening of this essay, it is necessary to clarify the researcher’s standpoint and 
the conceptual apparatus so abruptly introduced in the previous paragraph. As 
suggested above, the standpoint of the writer of this paper is less than (social) 
scientific, but also, more than simply ‘theoretical’. One could say that it is somewhat 
historical and therapeutic, which is to say that it is analytical in inspiration, 
anthropological in substance, and critical in aspiration. It is an example of trans-
positional work. Let us explain. 
The concept of ‘transition’ belongs to the application of the model of the cured 
body of the possessed, of therapeutic practices and rituals, to the study of the 
emergence of violence, acquisition and the state in so-called traditional societies.7 In 
the sense in which it is used here, ‘therapeutic’ refers to a liminal space created in 
order to allow the suspension of the desire to wholeness, the spread of all-out mimetic 
violence, and it is to be opposed to the set of (medicalised) techniques that in the form 
of ‘treatment’ permit the management of human conflict via the surveillance, 
securitization and harmonisation of the potentially disputant body.  This meaning 
pervades the understanding of dispute resolution mechanisms among tribal or 
traditional societies set out throughout this paper; what will be called hereafter ‘tribal 
justice’.  
The latter ritualises the agonism of the egalitarian circuit of social exchange 
and debt, and by doing so allows each singular individual the production and social 
expression of its potency; put otherwise, it recognises the individual’s sole right to use 
violence but makes it circulate in a peaceful mode.8 This is a thesis whose 
implausibility seems so obvious to us ‘moderns’ that we do not realise it is a 
standpoint whose possibility is without doubt, and hence we do not consider it. One 
simply has to give up the standpoint of the state’s legal centrality to see this: rather 
than pacification through harmony and integrity, which imply the pacification and 
integration of radical otherness, the therapeutic model referred to here teaches us that 
all the features we consider essential in ourselves and for others, stem from the 
                                                 
7 José Gil. Metamorphoses of the Body (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Gil 
observes that talk of “tribal societies” could ‘mean that it is as much about us as it is about exotic 
peoples’ (p. ix). The concept also echoes Varela’s use of the term, see n 4 below. 
8 For an instance of this, see the analysis of a protojudicial process among the Eskimos in n 2 above, 
273-278. I suggest we read Nader’s “plaintiff” as a later-day variation on the model of the powerful 
disputant body. In this respect, her argument against the pacifying use of ADR would be better 
understood as a defence of the social expression of potency.  
unrealisable desire to consider whole and substantial that which is virtual and 
fundamentally incomplete.9 
Harmony and the unrealisable desire to be whole (to get for myself the very 
thing that my rival desires) will be conceived here as intricately related, and they will 
be seen to provide the context for the current vogue of so-called alternative and 
exceptional dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) in the local and global arena. Laura 
Nader’s stance can be better understood from this perspective. Moreover, this 
standpoint may allow us to provide an answer to the question concerning the 
connection between local histories and global designs through/in the legal and 
political system. This question seems particularly relevant in respect to ADR, given 
the striking parallelism present at the local and transnational levels of its global 
widespread.10    
The basis for the study of the emergence of the state in the sense previously 
explained is to be found in a diversity of ethnographic sources: from Kuper’s 
descriptions of the Swazi Incwalla11 and Gil’s account of the role of Vendetta in 
Corsican oral tradition,12 to Comaroff & Roberts’s observations on dispute settlement 
among the Tswana.13 These sources are crucial in order to understand the resistance 
of ‘justice’ to complete systemic absorption (its ‘anti-political’ character), at the very 
same time that it provides a pivot for the emergence of political systemic closure by 
imposing itself and controlling the social source of conflict in authoritative manner 
(its ‘proto-political’ character). 
Transition, in the sense understood here, is associated with ‘trance’ and the 
metamorphoses of the singular body that take place in it (the becoming-animal, the 
becoming-object and the becoming-king’s body of the body), but more importantly, 
with ‘exfoliation’. This is ‘the diversification of the space where the body molts in 
                                                 
9 See on this Francisco J. Varela, La Habilidad Etica (Barcelona, Debate, 2003)110-113. I have 
deliberately paraphrased Walter Benjamin at the beginning of the paragraph. See n 26 below, 232. 
10 Although I will not elaborate the point here, it interests me the degree to which the phenomenon of 
ADR seems to challenge Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ distinction between “localised globalisms” and 
“globalised localisms” even at the analytical level. For the distinction see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
Towards a New Legal Common Sense (London, Butterworths/Lexis Nexis, 2002). 
11 Hilda Kuper, An African Aristocracy: Rank Among the Swazi (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1947). See also T. O. Beidelman, “Swazi Royal Ritual”, Africa 36 (Oct 1966), n. 4. 
12 José Gil, “Vendetta et pouvoir dans la tradition orale corse”, Les Temps Modernes (August-
September, 1978) 
13 John Comaroff & Simon Roberts, “The Invocation of Norms in Dispute Settlement: The Tswana 
Case”, in Social Anthropology and Law (London, Academic Press, 1977). 
leaves or scales that allow the direct branching of the body with things’.14 The space 
of the body is exfoliated or moulted so that it can enter into a relation with an object 
or another symbolically different space. The feeling of ubiquity described by 
participants in possession rituals is explained in just such a way. The same goes for 
historically famous experiences with political significance such as that of Saint Paul 
on the road to Damascus, but also for the ordinary feeling we try to express when 
some experience of alterity pushes us to change our pre-determined direction.15  
The property of the body to exfoliate is thus at the basis of the capacity of the 
body to translate forces into signs and to transfer them from one set of signs to 
another. Since ‘power’ is nothing other than the capacity to translate forces into other 
forces and into signs, state (legal) power can be represented as a body which inscribes 
certain signs and forces onto itself: the political body. This body comes about, more 
precisely, through the fixing of some sort of floating signifier –a sign that circulates 
freely in the social arena- into a ‘master’ or dominant signifier –a sign that takes itself 
as the place of inscription of all signs and forces-. The king’s body, for example, the 
sovereign, is just such a kind of signifier. 
 
3.  Ballad of Immoral Earnings: In State of Exception 
 
The concept of a ‘sovereign’ body is central to modern legal and socio-legal 
theory. Its clearest formulation can be found in the 1920’s constitutional theory of the 
state of exception developed by Carl Schmitt. According to Schmitt ‘sovereign is he 
who decides on the state of exception’.16 ‘State of exception’ is the constitutional 
legal term for a declaration of emergency followed by the suspension and/or 
limitation of rights and laws. It entails a re-concentration of power in the hands of the 
Executive who can therefore issue decrees to the detriment of the legislative function 
of Parliament or Congress; such decrees are known in the UK as issued under the 
‘royal prerogative’ (for instance the mobilisation of troops in state of war) and in the 
USA as ‘executive orders’ (for instance those related to the treatment of ‘illegal 
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15 I have in mind two different but related examples. Both come from analytical jurisprudence: The first 
one is H. L. A. Hart’s reaction after having read Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. The second one is the 
experience of William Twining, Hart’s student, in the Sudan. If we are to believe the biographical 
accounts, they were expressed in exactly the same way: ‘scales fell from my eyes’. The phrase is a 
description of the experience of exfoliation. 
16 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. Chicago University Press: 1996. 
combatants’ and the myriad regulations for Camp X-Ray in Guantánamo Bay after 
9/11). This constitutional figure runs counter to the ‘normal’ division of powers; as 
such, it is considered to be a transitory measure and therefore it marks the time of its 
being in force as a time of transition. 
Interestingly, Schmitt’s theory set up to demonstrate that far from being 
occasional, the state of exception had the potentiality of becoming the rule. In this 
sense, the time of transition threatens to become a permanent feature of the modern 
legal system. The realisation of the normality of the state of exception, or its 
potentiality, introduces a paradox at the very core of modern legality. The paradox 
dormant in the definition of sovereignty ‘consists in the fact that the sovereign, having 
the legitimate power to suspend the law, finds himself at the same time outside and 
inside the juridical order’,17 which also means that ‘the law is outside itself or: “I, the 
sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law”’.18  
This means that the quasi-transcendental conditions that establish any system, 
in this case the system of legal power grounded on the fixity of a master signifier 
(such as absolute sovereignty, Hart’s rule of recognition, Kelsen’s Grundnorm or 
Kant’s moral law), always imply a beyond. This implication suggests that there is a 
differential between the space-time of the legal system (the time of transition) and that 
of its beyond, i.e., they do not correspond. Put otherwise, this means that the space-
time of the law is, to abuse Shakespeare, ‘out of joint’.  
Walter Benjamin, entering the discussion of 1920’s German legal theory 
ensued by Schmitt’s challenge (in turn, spawned by the constitutional crises of the 
Weimar republic), attempted to respond to the problem of the non-correspondence of 
space-time by distinguishing between the state of exception (the time of transition) 
and what he called the ‘real’ state of exception (the time of redemption). His reference 
was to distinctions contained in the Jewish legal tradition that opposes the situation of 
exile to that of return. The event of return, the re-entry of the exiled body that 
unleashes the real, is Benjamin’s answer to Schmitt’s logic of exception.  
This is precisely the kind of event whose logic is at work in the emergence of 
the EZLN, referred to previously. But this realisation is only the starting point of our 
enquiry. Further, we shall focus on the following implications of the logic of re-entry:  
                                                 
17 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. by D.Heller-Roazen 
(Standford, Standford University Press, 1999) 161.  
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(a) That the non-correspondence of space-time and the antinomy of the 
law it founds, originates in certain events for which the body would 
be the seat. A small adjustment in the lexicon of therapeutic rituals 
concerning the body of the possessed in tribal societies, for 
example, allows the accumulation of forces and symbols in the 
emerging political body. The excess accumulated by the political 
body, the state, represents the surplus-value of state legal power. 
This surplus, or standing reserve, results from the deduction of 
goods and forces in specific social units (other object-bodies). 
Among these accumulated forces is time, coded in the form of 
determined work for the production of more and more goods. 
Power becomes power to make bodies work and the time of society 
becomes one of indefinite deferral: the normality of transition that 
underlines Schmitt’s speculation about the persistence of the state 
of exception. Countering this movement, re-entry must entail 
closure, the de-coding of coded time.  
(b) Re-entry or ‘transition’ always takes the form of a demand for 
justice; not this or that (ideological) conception of justice but a 
perennial requirement for justice, its universal declaration, as 
confronted with the imperatives of power. That is, the part of 
justice that resists ideological and/or systemic absorption. ‘Where 
does the universal declaration of justice comes from? ...The 
requirement for justice, hardly founded in natural or positive law, 
finds its origin in the emergence of people into society (their 
transition from particularity and generality into concrete 
universality). The protojudiciary processes of certain stateless 
societies would only be the return of mechanisms at the origin of 
the beginnings of social relations. This is to say that it is in the 
nature/society connection that justice is born’.19  These 
mechanisms have to do with the establishment of the circulation of 
singular forces or potentialities in the communal circuit and the 
commencement of the system of exchanges (the first controlling 
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the second). ‘Potentialities’ refer here to direct relations between a 
body and its environment considered from the perspective of the 
system itself.20 ‘Exchanges’ are circuits (of goods, services, 
language, beings) ruled by reciprocity; such rules are indeterminate 
and thus, the possibility of conflict is inscribed in the indeterminate 
space opened up by such rules to the social expression of affects. 
Conflicts or disputes are translated into a break in the exchange 
cycle, and dispute resolution –marked by flexibility born out of 
indeterminacy- aiming at restoring the cycle, attempts to do so by 
producing juridical ‘values’ (modifications of quantities 
exchanged: goods) and allowing debt (the affirmation of specified 
embodied potentiality: persons). The relation between these two 
levels of exchange is inversely proportional. The two-level and 
proportional nature of exchange is crucial to understand that every 
requirement of justice is about the affirmation of embodied 
potentiality (what ethnographers call ‘honour’ or ‘prestige’) as 
much as it is about the (re)establishment of values. This 
observation is important for the fleshing-out of what Laura Nader 
calls ‘the justice motive’,21 a key notion in her conception of the 
life of the law. 
(c) Judiciary dispute processes aim at the affirmation of the potency of 
bodies in the communal circuit and the continuation of the system 
of exchanges, and in particular at the maintenance of the agonistic 
context for the formation of debt (the surplus of a gift in relation to 
a counter-gift as a exact translation of individual honour), for the 
                                                 
20 That is, the environment as it impinges upon a body and is made significant by such a body. The 
body valorises such encounters (impingements) as having effect or not. The result is “affect”, an excess 
of meaning in respect to the perspective that constitutes the world of the cognitive agent. Affects 
(signified forces) are expressed in such terms as “ambition”, “vanity and self-regard”, “pride”, “desire 
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connection. See on the cognitive aspect Francisco Varela’s La Habilidad Etica, n 4 above, 28, 96-97, in 
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Lerner, ‘The Justice Motive in Social Behaviour’, Journal of Social Issues 31 (Summer 1975) 1-19. 
Also with Sapir’s work on linguistic drift, see Edward Sapir, Language (New York, Harcourt, 1921) 
and less directly with Karl Llewellyn’s treatment of drift. 
circuit of debts denies the accumulation of goods and disallows 
potency to found itself on such accumulation.22 Equality is here 
that of not being able to accumulate, of not having. Disputes are 
thus defined, narrowly, as a take over without any obligation for 
return.23 ‘There is conflict because the victim has been denied his 
exchange capacity for giving or deploying potency (on the basis of 
the item that has been “taken” from her. The agonistic exchange 
context thus finds itself overturned’.24 Injustice takes the form of a 
proposition such as ‘He has accumulated to the detriment of my 
potency or honour’, that is, to the detriment of my possibility to 
take part in the agonistic exchange that would allow me to control 
processes or change everyday life by means of the law. It must be 
remembered that ‘law’, in the sense it is being used here, is that 
normativity which opens up a space for the social expression of 
forces or the indetermination of behaviour (that Malinowski 
described as second group of norms or ‘civil law’).25 Thus ‘law’ 
here is the exact opposite of pacification; protojudiciary dispute 
processes correspond to a sort of agonistic ceremony that re-
establishes the circulation of power in the specified bodies of 
individuals, against its abstract singularisation in a (single) body. 
Justice is ‘first of all the right to singular potencies’,26 and thus it is 
universal in respect to the social relation: ‘If justice recreates social 
links with the same solidity (or the same fragility) that they had 
before the conflict, is this not because it puts into action originary 
mechanisms of the general social relation?’27 If justice is the right 
to ‘singular potencies’, and such potencies can be freely expressed 
only in the social space of conflict or dispute, exchanges and debt 
                                                 
22 N 2 above, 270. Contrary to what happens with economic exchanges after the emergence of the state, 
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(and/or its ritualised form in the protojudiciary process of dispute 
resolution), then pacification –understood as the political deduction 
or extraction of singular potency and the disavowal of agonism in 
dispute resolution- is profoundly unjust, in the sense that it allows 
for accumulation without return and the quieting of powerful 
bodies. Let us argue that this clarification allows a better 
understanding of what lies at the basis of Laura Nader’s critique of 
‘harmony ideologies’ and the centrality of the role of the plaintiff 
in her theory.28 The plaintiff, and in particular the civil (subaltern) 
plaintiff in the context of torts law and corporate power in the USA 
(personal injury actions by workers, passengers and pedestrians), is 
an specification of the affirmative singular powerful body fighting 
political extraction in the post-industrial revolution nation-state 
and/or the global marketplace.29 This clarification also helps to 
understand what was at stake in Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign 
as it developed into the concept of ‘nomos’, after the connection 
between the local crisis of the Weimar republic and the global 
arena became clearer: the new ‘nomos’, set to replace the 
Westphalian concept of law, is precisely one of pacification and 
hegemony30 at a planetary scale; but that new nomos was 
announced already in the very ‘original’ act of taking: the conquest 
of the New World. From this perspective, the single most important 
cross-cultural misunderstanding spawning the modern nomos (or 
Ius Publicum Europeum) can be seen in relation to the exchange of 
gifts between the American indigenes and the newly arrived 
Europeans; particularly as considered (or ignored) by so-called 
colonial ‘missionary courts’.31 
 
                                                 
28 See n 15 above, 32-34, 53, 164. For an analogous theorisation, this time in the realm of Human 
Rights see Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Notice the centrality of the affective notion of “suffering” in Baxi’s (counter)historical theory.  
29 n 15 above, 171-211 
30 n 15 above, 5. For Schmitt on “nomos” and pacification as the basis of modern international law see 
Marti Koskenniemi. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) 47-57.   
31 On missionary courts see n 15 above, 29, 31, 126-128. 
4.  I Read About Tank Battles: On the Use of Force 
 
Walter Benjamin understood the role of the plaintiff just too well. One of his 
early forays into the problem of law dealt with the question of the exclusive right to 
the use force by the state in connection to the lack of potency of individuals. Almost 
eighty years on, ethnographer José Gil shows the actuality of his analysis. He writes: 
  
In the reverse of tribal justice, which considered misdemeanours, or 
at least conflict, as a sort of normal illness in the social body, all violent acts 
are henceforth banned from society. A dual culpability will weigh on this 
domain, that which deals with the damage caused and that which is attached 
to the right to violence. The main culpability is to have violated the exclusive 
right of the state (i.e., to have stolen violence form the state), which makes 
everything prejudiced, guilty of being guilty. A strange process begins. 
Because potencies are deprived of symbolic counterparts, surfaces for social 
investment, they disappear; buried in the ideological bazaar of fantasies and 
the discourse of the state: it becomes a matter of “instincts”, “animal drives”, 
“passions”, “vices”, “bestial nature”-in short, the criminal body. Elsewhere 
we see emerging little by little the search for intention as the principle of 
responsibility…where honour used to control violence came to be placed the 
whole arsenal of evil and the crimes of a now profound conscience, an abyss, 
a well of guilt for having failed to remain vigilant over the body. Now the 
aporias of justice also begin.32 
 
    In his 1920’s The Right to Use Force,33 Benjamin sets up to review the 
arguments of one Herbert Vorwerk concerning the right to use force, published in the 
Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus. It is a short piece, four pages in the English edition 
of Benjamin’s Selected Writings; the style is that of a brief commentary following the 
citation of the key propositions in the argument. However brief, it holds a key insight 
when compared to Gil’s statement (and furthermore, in relation to Nader’s claims). 
The point is, in both cases, to emphasise that the context of dispute resolution after the 
emergence of the state is in the antipodes of that of tribal justice. More plainly, that 
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dispute resolution has become impossible after the emergence of the state insofar as 
the original dispute, the foundational inequality, i.e., the differential between the 
accumulation of forces by the state and the loss of potency of singular bodies, will 
always remain unsolved. In this context, every form of dispute resolution, including 
those that go under the label of being ‘alternative’ or ‘exceptional’ (to the state’s law) 
become varieties of law-preserving violence and, ultimately, part and parcel of a 
program of pacification which consists in the permanent vigilance and taming of the 
body. 
Notice that the very realisation of the context of post-state dispute resolution 
throws light on the centrality of the disputing body, a centrality that was already at the 
core of findings in ethnographic research on the nature and social function of justice. 
However an object of surveillance, the disputant body remains the ‘limit concept’ of 
modern day legal theory and practice, for it reveals the latter to fall pray to an 
unrealisable desire to wholeness: law is torn apart between its desire to dispense of the 
disputant body, to ‘dissolve the people’ in order to become whole, and its dependence 
on the creativity of the disputant body for its own existence. This is the ‘double guilt’ 
referred to by both Benjamin and Gil: law is guilty of failing to be whole and hence 
doubly guilty of failing to do justice to the disputant body.  
Nader’s powerful case against the pacifying use of ADR, what she calls 
‘harmony ideology’, is based precisely upon the recognition of the failure of the state 
towards the disputant body. To the extent that the state does fail to repay its debt to 
singular bodies, she is correct. However, she does not see that this failure is necessary, 
that the state is less concerned with justice than it is with its own survival.  
Put otherwise, Nader does not seem to consider to what extent the failure of 
the state towards the plaintiff is of a piece with its failure to be whole.  In any case, 
and here one must part ways with her conclusions, the life of the law seems to be 
determined by the creativity of the disputant body as much as it is by law’s own will 
to power; the same holds for ADR.  
In other words, ADR becomes an instance of the state of exception in the 
context of (post)state dispute resolution, for it is both outside and inside the law. The 
implications of the paradox thus introduced have already been highlighted. It will 
suffice to emphasise again that, if this is the case, then the discourse of harmony does 
not correspond to the reality of alternative dispute resolution. At the very least, such a 
discourse should always be considered suspicious when uttered in relation to ADR, 
for it obscures the unresolved character of the original inequality that allowed the 
appearance of the state in the first place.  
It also functions as a disavowal of the fact that every requirement of justice 
issued by a disputant body returns us to a justified indictment of the system as such 
(the ‘universal declaration’). Thus, there is a fundamental antagonism between the 
disputant body and the state that is never done away with, no matter how many or 
how strong rhetorical energies are invested in the ‘selling of ADR’ and/or in legal 
reform.34  
To this extent, Nader’s analysis of the arguments put forward during the 
Pound Conference in 1976 –the official launch pad of the contemporary ADR 
movement- is correct. The fact that the same arguments are present in the attempt to 
sell ADR in the UK civil jurisdiction nowadays means the latter can only be received 
with a healthy dose of scepticism. Between Chief Justice Warren Burger and Lord 
Wolff the only difference seems to be in the deepening of the desire of wholeness in 
the legal system.  
Further, ADR demonstrates the normality of the state of exception insofar as, 
on the one hand, it is an instance of its appearance beyond the realm of constitutional 
law (in civil law, as Schmitt predicted) while on the other, it lays bare a structural 
feature of legality as such (Schmitt’s ‘nomos’). That this structure is associated, 
theoretically and practically, with the twin experiences of colonialism and capitalism 
is a finding that we owe to the re-entry of anthropological observation into the legal 
system, and one that cannot go unnoticed.  
The effects of this irritation in the system are just starting to become apparent. 
To start with, we have to ask what the connection is, if any, between local ADR and 
inter- or trans-national ADR in the present context. Nader’s findings suggest that 
there is a connection and that it is to be found in the intersection between law and 
modern/colonial cultures. Let us suggest that this is perhaps the most important 
contribution of Laura Nader’s user theory to the study and practice of law in 
modernity, from the perspective of ethnography. Let us now try and pursue this 
problematic keeping in mind what we have already learned from our parallel reading 
of 1920’s German legal theory. It is in this spirit that we return to Benjamin’s The 
Right to Use Force. 
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Reading Benjamin’s piece in relation to Gil and Nader is indeed a fruitful 
experience. A few of the more detailed developments in the argument can be useful in 
order to try an answer the question concerning the connection between the local, the 
global and the universal.   We will deal only with two of them:  
Firstly, there is the question of the early appearance of a distinction between 
spatio-temporal orders in relation to the law in Benjamin’s piece. Benjamin claims 
that this difference in temporalities is the ‘subordinate reality which the law 
addresses’.35 We have already seen in relation to this point that the difference or non-
correspondence of space-time founds the antinomy of the law, and also that such a 
minimal difference was the consequence of certain events for which the body is the 
seat. Those events included the accumulation of force in the political body as opposed 
to that produced by and circulated amongst specific individual bodies.  
Tellingly, that is precisely the connection that Benjamin explores: following 
his distinction between the time of transition in which state-law exists (‘the violent 
rhythm of impatience’)36 and the cyclical or retroactive time of return (‘the good 
rhythm of expectation’)37 Benjamin moves onto the possible combinations of the right 
to use of force by the state, on the one hand, and by the individual on the other.  
Let us suggest to understand the time of return in a sense equivalent to the 
space of agonistic exchange (dispute), debt and gift –justice and protojudiciary 
processes- as described by ethnographers such as Gil and Nader; put otherwise, 
Benjamin’s standpoint in ‘moral philosophy’ is that of (in)justice as the right to 
singular potencies or, put in the terms of our case study, the power of the victim-
plaintiff as the generative mechanism of the legal system. It can be argued that this 
standpoint is persistent; it can be found again in the later Eight Thesis of the Theses 
on the Philosophy of History (‘the tradition of the oppressed…’).38 This is the 
standpoint that allows the bringing forth of the connection between the local and the 
global in the universal.  
As we will see, using for our purposes an analogous standpoint taken by 
certain recent developments in the humanities and the social sciences in Latin 
America (particularly concerned with the rise of ADR in the trans-national regional 
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“values” are not pre-given or trascendental but produced, for it is the space of circulation of forces? 
38 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed by H. Arendt (Pimlico, 1999) 
arena, specially after the signature of NAFTA and the proposal of the Free Trade 
Zone of the Americas, FTAA or ALCA, by the US), that connection has to do with 
the management of the differential in temporalities or, put otherwise, with what 
anthropologists call ‘the denial of coevalness’.39 The point is that the denial of 
coevalness has become the regional (and now planetary) hegemonic ideology in 
dispute resolution with the rise of trade-related & security-related ADR. The case in 
point is dispute resolution under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, a legal recipe that is 
becoming global through the international law of natural resources and investment 
protection and nowadays, also through security-related measures and policies. The 
former, supposedly marginal aspect of international law is the equivalent in the 
transnational arena of US anti-trust law in that it is becoming rapidly de-differentiated 
or else, it is effecting a basic shift (led by the Chicago school of economics) in the 
kinds of questions that count and that lawyers therefore feel are relevant to legal 
analyses.40 The connection with colonialism and capitalism becomes just all too clear 
from this perspective. We will come back to this point.    
Secondly, out of the four ‘critical possibilities’ or propositions on the question 
of the right to force by the state and/or the individual distinguished by Benjamin, it is 
the fourth, the most seemingly counter-intuitive, that should be of interest to us: The 
fourth proposition states ‘to recognize the individual’s sole right to use force’41. This 
proposition is counter-intuitive only from the standpoint of the state legal system, but 
it makes sense if considered from the standpoint of the victim-plaintiff or that of tribal 
justice taken alternatively by Nader and/or Gil.  
Moreover, it is worth noticing that Benjamin associates this standpoint to 
stateless societies (even though he is thinking about state societies) and to the logic of 
gift and debt:42 he argues that the monopoly over force (that characterises state 
societies as opposed to stateless) is ‘a gift bestowed by a divine power’.43 The ‘divine 
power’ referred to here is social rather than theological.44 More important, because it 
                                                 
39 The reference is to Johannes Fabian’s term for “a persitent and systematic tendency to locate the 
referents of anthropology in a time which is different from the present of the producer of the discourse 
of anthropology”. See J. Fabian, Time and the Other. How Anthropology Makes Its Objects (1983) 31   
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44 Compare to the following proposition found in the ethnographic work of Laura Nader: ‘As one 
plaintiff put it: “The act of God (which the defendants had argued against these practicing Christians!) 
is an absolute gift (bestowed by divine power) the monopoly over force creates an 
absolute debt and therefore, an absolutely agonistic context.  
Put otherwise, the individual (as singular universality) is fundamentally 
‘against the state’, to paraphrase Pierre Clastres, for the latter’s debt towards the 
former is absolutely unpayable. 45 
This realisation is crucial in many respects: as a basis for a critical discourse 
and practice of Human Rights, as a critical argument against the use of ADR and 
exceptionality in the context of harmony ideology or pacification, as an explanation of 
the relative autonomy of the legal system and/or the imbalance between legal power 
and social power, as a counter-argument in respect to the proposition according to 
which ‘in a constitutional state, the struggle for existence becomes a struggle for law’ 
insofar as state-legal recognition will never amount to the lack of potency introduced 
in society by its own emergence. Benjamin writes in this respect:  
 
It is quite wrong to assert that, in the constitutional state, the struggle 
for existence becomes a struggle for law. On the contrary, experience shows 
conclusively that the opposite is the case. And this is necessarily so, since the 
law’s concern with justice is only apparent, whereas in truth the law is 
concerned with self-preservation. In particular, with defending its existence 
against its own guilt. In the last analysis a normative force always comes 
down in favour of existing reality.46 
 
What does it mean to say that every struggle for law becomes a struggle for 
existence? What does it mean to say that normative force is on the side of existing 
reality? It means, on the one hand, that the absolute debt in favour of the individual 
plaintiff makes him/her/it the creative force of the (post)state legal system, always 
unleashing the real against repeated attempts to pacification; while, on the other, the 
legal system will claim authority (self-efficiency out of the impossibility to repay its 
debt to society) over and against the affirmative victim-plaintiff. Thus, if on the one 
side dispute resolution provides the creating force of the legal system, if it is ‘the life 
of the law’, as Nader says incarnated in the figure of the civil plaintiff (exercising 
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46 N 27 above, 232. Compare to n 26 above. 
law-making violence, to use Benjamin’s parlance) on the other it is a constant threat 
to its integrity (it is law-destroying violence) and thus it obliges law to engage in 
pacification (law-preserving violence) against its own guilt.  Laura Nader’s user 
theory of law correctly emphasises law-making potency at a time of widely spread 
efforts to quiet the plaintiff, but in doing so she pays less attention to the necessity of 
the other moments of the society/law dynamic, the darker ones if you like. She forgets 
that law is affected by a desire to be whole. (Post)state law is a failed integrity, a 
‘failed unity’.47 In that respect her conception of the law may be less nuanced than 
those found in Schmitt or Benjamin. But we will not pursue that issue here; what 
matters is to examine whether or not Nader’s critique of dispute resolution allows us 
to learn something else about the actual moment of the socio-legal dynamic; about the 
actual nomos of the law. 
      
  5.  Ballad of Sexual Dependency: ADR in Steroids. The NAFTA Case 
    
The signature of NAFTA sent wave-shocks throughout the Americas and the 
rest of the world. Formally a multilateral trade agreement, its greater repercussions 
were soon to be felt at many different levels: from the word maquiladoras, never 
before heard of, entering the vocabulary of activism and the media with the force of a 
natural phenomenon to the rise of the first post-modern guerrilla movement. The 
gesture of the EZLN seemed counterintuitive: firstly a (failed) attempt to exercise the 
individual’s sole right to use force, it successfully reinvented itself as a call for tribal 
justice aiming straight at the heart of modernity as embedded in capitalism.  
None of the more westernised models for the understanding of modern law 
and politics, of dispute resolution, seemed to account for such a possibility: to change 
the very terms of our discussions on economic, political, and even sexual dependency 
in the direction of a backwards leap in time. ‘Modernity’ was supposed to either 
having sublated traditional societies or being in the process of doing so; that ‘tribal 
justice’ could still have a place in the modern order of things was simply non-
processable information. Terms such as ‘anachronism’, ‘pre-modernity’, ‘backward 
                                                 
47 I have borrowed the notion of “failed one” from both Ernesto Laclau & Slavoj Zizek. The reference 
to the former is to an unpublished lecture delivered in June 2003 at the IV Graduate Conference on 
Political Theory at the University of Essex. Slavoj Zizek’s notion of the failed one, or as he says 
‘fragile absolute’ can be found in his The Fragile Absolute (Verso: 2000, 128) in connection with a 
critique of law & human rights that, against a common trend in mainstream political philosophy, 
engages with the historical legacy of non-sacrificial violence and the sacred.    
societies’, ‘primordial violence’, and ‘underdevelopment’ only masked the impotence 
of the experts’ apparatuses of knowledge. 
Just that it was not the first time: the descent of Shining Path from the high 
planes of Ayacucho into Lima and the extent of the hold over southern Colombian 
territory by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) had already 
taken Latin American social scientists off guard before. Legal Anthropologist Sylvia 
Rivera Cusicanqui,48 whose fieldwork in the High Andes had taken her back and forth 
between Colombia, Peru and her native Bolivia, had been warning long ago about a 
the need for a switch of standpoint as a condition for the understanding of these 
phenomena that seemed unthinkable at first. Lawyers and politicians only paid 
attention when the bombs started exploding.49 
Her point was simple: by placing these phenomena in a time that is inferior to 
our present we are not merely avoiding conflict, but we are actually denying its 
existence. It is not the case that we would simply prefer to avert confrontation (that 
which presupposes from the start that ‘we’ are peaceful, harmonious, i.e., civilised) 
but rather, that we have stripped existing reality from its normative force.  
It is the same lack of potency in our societies that explains both the appearance 
of such phenomena as Shining Path (FARC, EZLN or the Palestinian resistance) and 
our inability to relate to their existence. This lack at the heart of our societies is an 
enduring consequence of modern colonialism, for it is our very standpoint, our 
perception of ourselves –our will to see ourselves from the outset in the image of the 
civilised, our rival/model- that blinds us from the truth. The screen that has been set in 
front of our very eyes in order to blind us from the truth is thus the denial of 
coevalness.50 The mechanism at work in such an elaborate deception, and that Rivera 
Cusicanqui associates with the (gendered/literate) Andean postcolonial persona, is the 
same that Franz Fanon described as ‘transitivity’ in the context of North African de-
colonisation. Put otherwise, what social scientists were missing, what they keep 
missing, is the connection between the local ‘we’ and the global ‘them’, and the fact 
                                                 
48 Her work pertains the notion of law in the context of postcolonial modernity; in particular the role of 
patriarchalism and literacy in the construction of a “gendered” conception and practice of the law. 
49 ‘“The legal system tends to react to attempts to destroy it by resorting to coercion, whether it be 
coercively to preserve or to restore the right order.” This statement is correct in itself, but it is a mistake 
to explain it with reference to the internal tendency of the law to establish its authority. What is at issue 
here is a subordinate reality, which the law addresses’; this is W. Benjamin. See n 23 above, 231. 
50 See n 33 above. 
that they both incarnate in the same persona. Hence the call for a switch of 
standpoint, in the form of a denial of the denial of coevalness. 
    That call has been answered. In the years following the events mentioned 
before, sociologists, anthropologists, activists, plaintiffs and academic lawyers 
developed conceptual frameworks and policy-oriented strategies that took into 
account transitivity, the affirmation of coevalness and the absolute character of 
conflict from a world-historical perspective.51  Among them, perhaps the most fruitful 
in terms of explanatory power and plaintiff activism have been the concepts of ‘trans-
modernity’ and ‘coloniality of power’.52 From the perspective opened up by such 
concepts, a series of events that for many were simply unthinkable (e.g., the fall of 
socialism, globalization, 9/11) started to make sense. Clearly, explanation did not lead 
to justification but rather, to careful appreciation of geo-historical antagonisms arising 
with the emergence of the state in (post)colonial contexts: the unpayable debt. 
Particular attention was given to the way in which such conflicts were being 
‘resolved’: analysts found dispute resolution mechanisms wanting, more a stronger 
form of pacification than dispute processing, leading to increases in violence.53    
Notice that the form of causality that is implied by terms such as ‘emergence’ 
or the notion of an unpayable debt, is retroactive. Retroactive causality is the 
mechanism at work in the EZLN invocation of the microworlds and the 
microidentities of the Mexican Revolution and the 500 years of indigenous resistance 
against colonial rule in order to provide a meaning for its actions in the 1990’s. It 
                                                 
51 For the emergence of this perspective in the context of Latin American traditions of thought see 
Eduardo Mendieta, Latin American Philosophy. Currents, Debates, Issues. Indiana University Press: 
2003. 
52 “Trans-modernity” is a term coined by philosopher Enrique Dussel. It refers to the the double 
character of modernity, the two waves of agonistic modernisation resulting in the emergence of the 
Atlantic circuit, the first true world-system. “Coloniality of power” and “modern coloniality” refer to 
ongoing processes of (primitive) accumulation as the engine of modernity. Practices associated with or 
interpreted trough these notions include indigenous plaintiff and political activism (e.g., Colombia v. 
U’wa, anti-FTAA activism, the World Social Forum) and the setting up of network-academic projects 
such as subaltern legal studies in the context of the emergence of the Indigenous University in Ecuador 
or the coloniality of power studies group. See Enrique Dussel, ‘The Architectonics of the Ethics of 
Liberation. On Material and formal Ethics’., 23 Philosophy and Social Criticism 3, 1997, 1-35, also 
available at http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/dussel/artics/archi.pdf. Also, Edgardo Lander (ed.) La 
Colonialidad del Saber: Eurocentrismo y Ciencias Sociales, CLACSO: 2000.  
53 See O. Guardiola-Rivera, D. López, C. Sandoval et al. (eds.) La Otra Guerra. El Derecho Como 
Continuación del Conflicto y Lenguaje de Paz (Bogotá, Plaza & Janés, 2000). Also S. Castro-Gómez & 
O. Guardiola-Rivera. “El Plan Colombia, O de Cómo Una Historia Local Se Convierte en Diseño 
Global”, in Revista Nueva Sociedad 175 (Caracas, Venezuela, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 2001). The 
broader perspective in Enrique Dussel, Etica de la Liberación en la Era de la Globalización y la 
Exclusión (Madrid, Trotta, 1999) and Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs. Coloniality, 
Subaltern Knowledge and Border Thinking (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999). 
entails that there is no prime mover, and therefore no hierarchical ordering of being, 
any (spatial or temporal) primacy or priority, no linear continuity, no origin and no 
genealogy, no myth of inheritance, no self-constitution and thence, no transcendence. 
Therefore it entails also the denial of the denial of coevalness54 in space and time. Put 
otherwise, it entails the reality of a simultaneity of practices of temporality and space 
and hence the inevitability of world-historical conflict. To put it in other terms: it is 
not the case that there are several modernities, some more or less primitive, each of 
them irreducible to others, but rather, that since the fifteenth century every single 
community on the face of the earth has been affected by the differentiating procesess 
of modernization. The point is that faced with this conflict (how to contain the 
antagonism of society?) the state legal system is impotent, the unpayable character of 
its debt to society revealed. Its reflex-like reaction is to (re)claim authority over and 
above the victim-plaintiff and to engage in pacification.   
Back to NAFTA: Chapter 11 contains a series of rules for the protection of 
foreign investment in the context of the treaty. As said before, it is a heady mix of 
fairly well known principles of international law concerning the protection of property 
and some radically new ideas about what may count as expropriation and what the 
mechanisms for the resolution of potential disputes may be. The central situation 
under consideration by this body of regulation is that of the taking of the property of a 
foreign investor by a state, a situation that is of particular importance in the 
supposedly marginal but hugely important field of the (international) law of natural 
resources.  
The law of natural resources deals with the circulation and exchange of the 
forces of nature signified as ‘resources’ or standing reserve; and in this circuit states, 
corporations and individuals inevitably clash. Put otherwise, this is the site of the 
translation of natural forces into signs; what once used to be the reserve of the 
magical-religious establishment. 
No wonder then, the first step following decolonisation in the heavily 
politically invested projects of state-building of the 1960’s and 1970’s included the 
taking of natural resource industries. We have learned already that the state seems to 
have come to occupy the place reserved before for the magical-religious 
establishment by making itself the site of inscription of all potencies; today however, 
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it seems that the state must share its place, increasingly, with the foreign investor in 
the form of the multinational corporation. We have also learned that the monopoly on 
legitimate violence overturns the regime of exchange. Thus ‘we could be led to 
believe that this “division” that magical-religious potencies installs between gods and 
people tends to reproduce itself in the heart of society, and this would be partly true, 
but it does not happen without some essential changes’.55 Another way to put this is 
to say that after the debunking of the place of the sacred in tribal societies, men will 
become gods for each other.56 
On the other hand, experience tells us that the extraction and circulation of 
natural forces, and their accumulation in the form of a standing reserve brings power. 
There is of course some truth to this common sense; however, only when considered 
in the context of the monopoly of violence, the overthrow of the sacred and the 
reproduction of division within society, we can understand the importance of the role 
played by states, investors and individuals in the regime of exchange of natural 
resources and the centrality of the body of rules that regulates such an exchange in 
post-traditional societies.  
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 is just such a kind of regime. Its particularity derives 
from the peculiar nature of its conception of standing reserve (or ‘property’ object of a 
taking) and the mechanisms it introduces for the resolution of disputes which, when 
                                                 
55 n 2 above, 289, also 253-254. It would be very interesting, although it is beyond the scope of this 
essay, to enquire about the “essential changes” that are needed for the reproduction of the division 
between gods and people within society, firstly with the emergence of the state and secondly, with that 
of the multinational corporation. There are already two hugely interesting anthropological advances on 
the first direction: Fernando Coronil, The Magical State. Oil, Modernity and Power in Venezuela (Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999) and Michael Taussig, The Magic of the State (¿?).  
56 René Girard explains this in the context of the demise of the magical-religious by the legal-political 
during the French Revolution. According to him the previous acceptance of the Divine Right of Kings 
structured a certain kind of (magical-religious) transcendence that underwrote other forms of social 
differentiation. This very tangible presence of the King was offset by his status as a quasi-divine figure 
(the instantiation of an “immense spiritual distance” between him, his subjects and the rest of the 
population). ‘When this divine right was abandoned with the overthrow of the monarchy, another 
equally secular theology took its place: “idolatry of one person is replaced by hatred of a hundred 
thousand enemies: Men will become gods for each other”’. The point is that, absent the absolute figure 
of the sacred-external mediator, mediation becomes “internal”; that is, men start to look at each other 
as models and rivals and violence spreads as a result of the combination of competition and emulation, 
involving valuable objects only secondarily. The primary variable is the desire/envy of other that 
makes objects valuable in the first place. See on this Fleming, Chris. René Girard: Mimesis and 
Violence (Polity, 2004) 30. It is important to remember that one of the decisive elements in the 
overthrow of the monarchy in Europe is the “discovery” of societies “without state” (that is, without 
Kings) in the Americas. 
combined, produce a legal recipe like no other for the withering away of the (civil) 
victim-plaintiff. Some may say the withering away of law as we know it.57   
It was only after the Methanex and Metalclad cases attracted the attention of 
the media and the public that the wider implications of the dispute resolution 
mechanisms included in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 were confronted. In November 17, 
2001 a journalist named William Greider posted an article in the web site of the US 
weekly The Nation under the provocative title “The Right and US Trade Law: 
Invalidating the 20th Century”. The article sparked an ongoing debate on the 
internationalisation of ADR and globalization in the context of trade ideology, which 
suggested that the stakes of the question concerning the direction of the law and extra-
legal or exceptional processes were higher than previous analyses had ventured.58 
Methanex v. The United States originated in the mid-1990’s in California. The 
facts are not unlike those of the civil wrongs cases that appear in Nader’s literature, in 
Jonathan Harr’s novel A Civil Action, or in the Hollywood film of the same name in 
which John Travolta plays the leading role: a group of neighbours notices high levels 
of pollution in the water sources; the alleged culprit is a Canadian company called 
Methanex which may have been spilling an unregulated chemical component called 
MTBE in the water sources.  
After the fact-finding phase is completed and pollution is confirmed, the state 
government acts quickly in order to ban the substance. Then the script goes wrong; 
the corporation sues the state under Chapter 11 for the violation of investor’s 
protection provisions. Methanex Corporation, which manufactures methanol, 
principal ingredient of MTBE, claimed that banning the additive in the largest US 
market violated the foreign-investment guarantees embodied in Chapter 11 of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.  
Under Chapter 11, foreign investors from Canada, Mexico and the United 
States can sue a national government whenever a company's property assets, 
including the intangible property of expected profits, are damaged by laws or 
                                                 
57 At least of law in the sense described by Nader (see n 15 above, 171-198). The point is that the 
ongoing reactionary revolution in the regime of natural resources threatens to make factually 
impossible the kinds of “civil wrongs” cases described so passionately by Nader and others. Put 
otherwise, the doctrine of “regulatory takings” which according to some, as we will see, is at the basis 
of the ongoing revolution on the notion of property could be understood as the most radical project of 
“legal wholeness” to date.  
58 E.g. Laura Naider, ‘The Direction of the Law and the Development of Extra-Judicial Processes in 
Nation-State Societies’, in P. Gulliver (ed.) Cross-Examinations: Essays in Memory of Max Gluckman 
(Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1978) 78-95  
regulations of virtually any kind. This doctrine, the brainchild of Chicago Law in 
Economics Professor, Richard Epstein, is known as ‘regulatory takings’.  
‘The company did not take its case to US federal court. Instead, it hired a 
leading Washington law firm, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, to argue the billion-dollar 
claim before a private three-judge arbitration tribunal...’, Greider tells us,  ‘...an 
"offshore" legal venue created by NAFTA’59. The nature of these tribunals has 
allowed the relatively obscure doctrine of ‘regulatory takings’ –which has been 
consistently rejected by the US courts- to become a rising paradigm in international 
property law. 
Metalclad v. Mexico, a similarly argued case involving a waste processing 
multinational corporation facing stringent environmental measures in the Latin 
American country, was decided also by a private ‘Chapter 11’ arbitration tribunal. 
The tribunal awarded the multinational $16 million dollars of Mexican taxpayer’s 
money. In 2001, there were 18 cases pending under NAFTA. In a letter sent to the 
then US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, 29 major multinational corporations 
urged him to push for the same NAFTA investor provisions in the Free Trade 
American Agreement (FTAA) negotiations: the way forward is going global.  
The letter claimed the necessity of ‘providing  protection from regulations that 
diminish the value of investors’.60 Asked to comment on the content of the letter, 
former deputy NAFTA negotiator and USTR civil servant Charles Roh exclaimed: 
‘…if they are doing that, they’re going to put Middle America on the barricades 
alongside the environmentalists’.61 Not everyday an obscure legal theorist such as 
Richard Epstein can be charged with the accusation of having the potential to spark a 
revolution. 
The point is that NAFTA arbitrators, unable to overturn domestic legislation, 
can award huge damages that maybe nearly as crippling ‘chilling governments from 
acting once they realize they will be “paying to regulate”’.62 Not only that, investor-
to-state dispute resolution provides a way for foreign litigants to seek government 
compensation for damages ordered by domestic courts in civil wrongs cases; if 
successful, it would do away with the potency of the civil plaintiff acting under the 
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November 17, 2001. 
60 Cited by Greider, see n 52 above. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
modern law of torts in these cases.63 Furthermore, conflicts that are by definition 
public insofar as they involve the ‘unpayable debt’ that the state owes to the 
individual end up being decided by private, closed-doors tribunals. 
Interestingly, the arguments used to sell ‘regulatory takings’ and alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms always link foreign investment protection to ethical 
issues regarding security and corruption: there is lots of corruption and political 
instability in their ‘not so well-ordered’ countries, hence the need to protect ‘our’ 
investors. Whether or not Mexican courts are actually ‘notoriously corrupt’64 becomes 
irrelevant. Even more ironic, not even US courts have been deemed to be sufficiently 
‘neutral’ and the cases have been taken to the ‘offshore legal venue’. What is of 
interest to us here is the manner in which a global (in this case hemispheric) design of 
pacification is linked to a local history, through the imaginary construction of the 
other as ‘unlike us’. Franz Fanon, writing in the context of the struggle against 
colonisation, described this mechanism with the term ‘transitivity’. His analysis  
provides a way to clarify Nader’s association between the rise of ADR and what she 
terms the ‘therapy paradigm’. This association explains, in turn, the parallelism 
between the domestic and the transnational forms of alternativity and exceptionality 
in dispute resolution: there is a particular philosophy of history at work here, one of 
time unleashed and projected in linear manner towards the future. The analysis of a 
particular case of the pacifying use of ADR bring us back, in full circle, to the non-
correspondence of space-time and to the state of exception where the missionary 
courts of then and now situated their jurisprudence.                
     
6.  Solidarity Song (Finale): A Critique of Violence 
   
In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon demonstrated how colonial 
subjectification involved the pathogenic incorporation of the white other as Ideal-ego. 
According to Fanon, as the black subject entered the phenomenal world of the white 
gaze, he was rejected at the level of body image and differentiated in comparison to 
the exemplary white subject whom he then attempts to emulate and compete with. As 
a result of this process the white double is then interiorised as ideal-I by the black 
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Greider as explaining investor-state provisions to the US Congress. 
subject, that which results in an obsessive neurotic formation and widespread 
violence. Thereafter the black subject becomes engaged in constant self-reproach and 
despair, always trying to become what he/she can never become, condemned to an 
illusion of transcendence.65 
‘Transitivity’ is therefore a case of the rival/model dynamics that we discussed 
before in the context of Girard’s explanation of the results of the overthrow of the 
monarchy and the emergence of liberal democracies based upon equality. The 
persistence of this generative mechanism is indeed remarkable: it can be used as a 
basis for a better understanding of similar latent transfers that transpire in today’s 
broader politico-legal field. Certain unreflective scripts, such as Human Rights 
universalism and ADR (as we have seen in the NAFTA case) can be seen as imposing 
transitivism in more or less benign ways, by assuming the relative other as mimicking 
the liberal civilised subject’s moral gestures at the imaginary level. Such scripts do 
not reflect upon the spread of mimetic war and violence that follows the inscription of 
the law (as human rights and ADR) at a planetary scale. 
Nader’s argument regarding the relation between ADR and the therapeutic 
paradigm, and the sort of widespread passive violence that results from it, can be 
understood in this sense. According to her, representatives of the therapy community 
who have played and important role in the debates over ADR (but also international 
lawyers, as we have seen) emphasise a certain ego-ideal which clearly corresponds to 
the attributes of the civilised, literate persona: self-aware, harmonious, avoiding 
polarization, always in place, in control of his emotions, a moral manager of conflict, 
a gentle civiliser of nations. This is a long cry from the social expression of affects 
involved in tribal justice; however, in a reversal of sorts, this persona is usually 
presented as ‘traditional’. Nader writes in relation to the work of linguist-cum-
therapist Deborah Tannen: ‘[She] holds that Americans argue too much and we ought 
to stop arguing and emulate Asian traditions (Asians, by the way, do not have state 
democratic traditions) that avoid polarization and focus on harmony to manage 
conflict.’66 The reversal involved in Tannen’s argument is of course a case of 
orientalism, but the transitivist mechanism is still in place:  the ego-ideal is to be 
mimicked. Nader’s judgement on the matter is straightforward:  
                                                 
65 We are reminded of Mexican president Salinas de Gortari’s ‘we have entered the first world’. 
66 n 11 above, 148-149 
One might call [this] position Machiavellian or categorize it as a 
form of conflict prevention. I would prefer to call it a cop-out, an avoidance 
of root causes by means of human management techniques. The United 
States went through this same ideological movement at the turn of the 
century –again pacification- a movement not too far from Roger Fisher’s 
“getting to yes” (1981) through negotiation practices.67 
 
After reading this passage it is worth to remember how months before the 
breakdown of the ‘peace process’ in Colombia, the conflict resolution process 
involving the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government 
in 2002, Roger Fisher was invited by the office of the President in order to guide 
official ‘negotiators’ to get the stubborn guerrilleros to ‘say yes’. The picture of 
Roger Fisher and/or his trainees’ harmony discourse –‘negotiate’, ‘strike a deal’, ‘let’s 
get to a win-win situation here’- would be a sad, even laughable case of transitivism if 
not because it revealed something more alarming at work in that particular case: that 
this was never a conflict resolution situation but rather one of pacification. Indeed, 
never has harmony seemed more coercive than in the years following the breakdown 
of the peace process in Colombia.  
This anecdote –which is really an amateur exercise on participant observation- 
is not digressive: what interests this researcher about Nader’s position on the role 
played by the therapy paradigm in the rise of ADR and exceptionality is the 
possibility of a generalisation concerning two phenomena that seem over present and 
under theorised in her rendition of a user theory of law. Firstly, the increasing 
presence of what she calls ‘human management techniques’ in the legal system and 
secondly, the issue of pacification. It can be argued that these questions hold the key 
for understanding the connection between the local and the global that lies behind 
planetary spread of the ADR/Exception  phenomenon. 
‘Pacification’ is, one the one hand, related to the role played by therapy talk in 
the discursive articulation of ADR and exceptionalism as part and parcel of ‘a 
reactionary law reform movement’:68  
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68 n 11 above, 140. The context of Nader’s statement is the analysis of the hegemonic discourses at the 
1976 Pound Conference that launched the ADR movement in the USA. The law reform movement is 
“reactionary” against the rights movements of the 1960’s. 
Relationships, not root causes, and interpersonal conflict resolution 
skills not power inequities or injustice was, and still is, at the heart of ADR. 
In ADR, civil plaintiffs are perceived as “patients” needing treatment, and 
when the masses are perceived in this way, policy is invented not to empower 
the citizen but to treat the patient.69 
  
At a deeper level, pacification relates to transitivism as the mechanism through 
which the other is constructed in the image of the ideal-I, but also, the containment of 
the political potential of the masses. We have learned with Fanon that this mechanism 
was at the core of the colonial enterprise. More generally, following Girard and Zizek, 
we have learned that this is the generative mechanism of our ‘law & order’ and 
‘security & progress’ arrangements, based upon sacrificial violence and unable to 
contain it.70  At this point, the connection between the local story and the global 
design becomes all too clear: the rhetoric ‘our courts are too crowded, and our 
lawyers and people are too litigious; the solution has to be the multidoor virtuous 
agencies of settlement or reconciliation’, symmetrical to ‘our investors must be 
protected from their corrupt courts; the solution has to be the virtuous agencies of 
arbitration’ gets translated into ‘we are unlike them’, a proposition that takes a whole 
different meaning whether it is uttered by the subaltern or the hegemon, as Gil, Fanon, 
Girard and others carefully explain.  
That proposition becomes the very criterion for the definition of one’s 
province at the same time that it defines what lies beyond and is excluded from the 
province, and the desire to encompass (as victim-scapegoat) the excluded outside. It 
sets in motion a logic of inclusion/exclusion that constitutes the very space of 
judgement. It is ‘the judgement of Hercules’,71 the ‘sovereign decision’ in the 
language of Carl Schmitt, the ‘hard choice’ in the language that glorifies certain 
versions of cost-benefit analysis. The sovereign body and the ideal-I incarnate in the 
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States. The reference is to the mythical figure with whom the architects and rulers of the circuit of the 
Atlantic identified themselves. It meant territorial centralisation, imperialist ambition and economic 
progress. The identification was in relation of opposition to the many-headed Hydra, which in turn, 
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tribal justice. These two figures are the persistent mythical lexicon of modern law to these days: the 
first one lurks behind the judge protagonist of Ronald Dworkin’s story titled, adequately Law’s 
Empire; the second is the basis for Laura Nader’s plaintiff as the life of the law. 
political body emerging out of the modified possession ritual, in the accounts of 
ethnographers, presenting itself as the place of inscription of the potency of singular 
bodies. 
‘But the hegemonic elements of this control are far more pervasive than the 
direct extension of state control’, says Nader.72 ‘Human management techniques’ 
refers to a set of strategies that make the sovereign’s decisions not only acceptable but 
actually desirable; the interiorisation of the ideal-I, as explained by Fanon in the 
context of colonisation, the capacity of the (political) body to exfoliate through 
rhetorical oratory techniques, as explained by Gil,73 and the rival/model dynamic 
explained by Girard, go a long way to explain the phenomenon of the coexistence of 
widespread violence and voluntary servitude in our societies of law and order . Nader 
refers to it with the more politically sounding term ‘hegemony’ and the perhaps 
trivialising but equally effective ‘mind colonisation’.74  
Decision is invariably uttered in the state of exception by a desired/desirable 
sovereign body.  As we know already, the term ‘state of exception’ refers to the law 
being in force without significance, a condition that expresses both the (use of) 
accumulated violence of the state (or Gewalt) and the affective response of people 
under threat, in emergency. The response to that condition by the resistant disputant 
body can only take the form of a critique of violence (Kritik der Gewalt).75  
As we have learned before –thanks to Benjamin- this sort of critique seeks to 
elaborate on the structural origin of the law in the constitutional ‘state of exception’, 
law’s term for foundational sacrificial violence.76 But it is very important to 
acknowledge that the object of such a critique is not just in the past. Recent appeals to 
law’s originary resort on sacrificial violence can be seen, for instance, in the current 
arguments concerning the ‘justification’ of torture in the context of the war on terror. 
Thus, a critique of violence operates by revealing the logic of exclusion and surrogate 
victimage at work in the functioning of the law and its location in a time of transition, 
suspension, or ‘missing time’.  
According to this logic, that which is excluded is not, for this reason, simply 
without relation to the rule since the rule maintains itself in relation to the exception 
                                                 
72 N 15 above, 141 
73 See n 2 above, 187-194. 
74 On “mind colonisation” see n 15 above, 5; on “hegemony” n 15 above, 117-121. 
75 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in M. Bullock & M. W. Jennings, Selected Writings, 
Volume 1, 1913-1926 (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000) 236-252.  
76 On sacrificial violence, see Fleming, Chris. René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, Polity: 2004. 
in the form of suspension. Put otherwise, the rule maintains itself (and reintroduces 
order in the social) by subtracting the exceptional element from the set of society and 
focusing on it the violence of the whole of society, represented by the state. In order 
to do so it introduces in society forms of internal differentiation or mediation, more 
often than not in the form of distinctions between what is normal or standard (and is 
thus on the side of order and society) and what is pathological (and becomes thus 
disorder and the outside of society).  
When used as norms, these distinctions go by the name of ‘standards’; 
importantly, the particular force of a standard is its formal/empirical character, i.e., its 
being empty from any content while relating to a huge breadth of data: they are 
formal, empty, signifiers that become master signifiers when connected to certain 
forms of probabilistic reasoning. This is not the place to question the possibility and 
validity of such forms of reasoning. It will suffice to recognise their normative 
potential. Having become an empty signifier that is also a living value within society, 
a standard takes the form of a transitory rule in perpetual change (its destiny to 
replace and be replaced, disposed of) and psychically desired (it is asked for by the 
people at risk, used as a model). As standards, these rules are shaped by our desires 
and thus indicate what such desires are, eventually yielding the rudiments of the 
fantasy that founds us as ‘people at risk, asking to be defended’.77  
Insofar as time is central in this fantasy, the time of catastrophe, the time of 
the end, hence the apocalyptic character of contemporary politics, let us consider first 
the desire of instant gratification realized in the proliferation of legal standards. Just 
like vending machines, fast-food restaurants and dot.com banking, standardised law 
(law in state of suspension) promises the abolition of waiting time and thus acquires a 
messianic feature: that of overcoming, in an instant, the imminent threat.  
But that is not all. This law is also marked by an attitude of appealing 
availability. One is reminded of the final line in Kafka’s Before the Law: ‘No one else 
could enter here, since this door was destined for you alone’.  This law offers more 
than the abolition of waiting time; you will be served and waited upon. Finally, the 
consumer of the law –the body that defines its power in accordance to the standard- is 
catered to via the fantasy of getting to ‘it’ with little or no effort, power becoming the 
                                                 
77 The reference here is to Michel Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended (1997-2003), which traces the 
rise of the power of police-knowledge (biopolitics) and exceptionality (the normal and the 
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capacity to identify oneself with th that the pacified individual, narcissistic and 
isolated, portrayed by sociology as alone, conflict-adverse and full of himself –that is, 
in ‘harmony’- is but an illusion produced by the actual rules of the game of 
competition, dispute and conflict. If, on the contrary, the subject posited by this 
tradition is antagonistic and in state of lack, this is so because he/she is profoundly 
concerned with the other, whom she imitates and whose standpoint she must be able 
to share if she is to make sense of the world. David Hume and Adam Smith called this 
faculty “sympathy”; contemporary cognitive scientists such as Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela speak of “transition”, striking a chord that resonates with the 
anthropologists.  
Transitivity or imitation –mimesis- lies at the very origin of conflict and 
dispute; lack and antagonism remain at the core of society beneath the surface 
appearance of harmony, even more so in post-modern societies. Because of this, any 
general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the time of 
globalization must make the intra- and trans-national experience of antagonism and 
violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its object-matter of 
study.  
To do this, it must abandon the dualist conception of subjects and societies 
expressed in the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not-so-well-ordered’ 
societies that has informed its investigation to this day. Not in order to justify the 
sovereign’s monopoly of violence as the cause of social harmony, but rather, in order 
to declare in the most general terms a critique of violence from the standpoint of the 
victim, as of a piece with its demand for global social justice.  
On this aspect, the findings of anthropologists such as Laura Nader and Jose 
Gil –that the study of the reality of dispute and dispute resolution is badly served by 
the model of harmony/equality, and that the pacifying use of this model becomes an 
obstacle to any politics of common justice- are far closer to the truth than the 
intuitions of mainstream legal theory and political philosophy. In the following 
sections, we shall focus on Nader’s study of the effects of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (ADR) in the law and politics of common justice. e standard; 
in the case of war-time suspension, for instance, by watching t.v. depictions of the war 
going on in some place between fantasy and this pressing reality. The rise and 
expansion of value-standardisation, spectacle and the power of policing the body, 
amounts to a generalised form of suspension, a hallucinatory visual world where 
instant gratification is paramount but short term, and the need increases quantitatively. 
This leads to unpleasure (Freud), destruction tied up to the will to know and fear of 
retaliation (Klein) and ultimately to a paranoid-schizoid position that deposits its own 
aggressive desires in the other (Girard). The end result is an impoverished ego, which 
can only ‘recover’ by reclaiming that which has been cast out. This is the point of this 
essay’s talk of the discovery of a logic of exclusion/inclusion at work in the schema of 
suspension.  
 A critique of violence relates this logic and the entire schema of suspension to 
a ‘crit’ historical ontology of the present and its actual transformation via the re-entry 
of the other (the cast out, the innocent victim or scapegoat), not as reclaimed or 
included (as in our fantasy landscapes of multiculturalism and harmony) but as 
[him/her/itself] the powerful victim-claimant.  
 
 
